Hello. This is Hisanori Iijima. Today, I would like to consider one of the most controversial questions in the studies of language–Sapir-Whorf hypothesis”. According to this hypothesis, human’s thoughts are reflected in their production of language. However, this hypothesis is highly debated and discussed. Then, let me discuss the “Sapir-Wholf hypothesis”.
How to Categorize the world
People categorize things, events, and relations in the world according to their similarities, and create categories. Theoretically, there are an infinite number of ways to divide the world, and an infinite number of categories can be created.
Theoretically, there are an infinite number of ways to divide the world and an infinite number of categories can be created (Goodman, 1983). However, among them, the conceptual categories based on one criterion are not the same as those based on another criterion.
This is probably due to the fact that we are human nature. This is probably because it reflects our natural and instinctive way of dividing the world. Human concepts are often thought of in terms of a tree structure, with the larger divisions gradually being subdivided into smaller ones, and this system is often referred to as an ontological tree.
The highest ontological tree is called the “ontological tree”. The highest level of the ontological tree, or the most basic division that forms the basis of the concept of humanity, is called the ontological division, and it includes the distinction between beings (matter) that have physical mass and abstract concepts and events, the distinction between natural and artificial things, the distinction between living and nonliving things, the distinction between individuated and non-individualized beings, and so on. The distinctions between animate and inanimate, between individuated and non-individualized existence, etc., are generally considered to be basic ontological categories (Sommers, 1963; Neil, 1979; Chi, 1992).
How are these basic distinctions in the concept of human being reflected in language?
How are these basic divisions in the concept of human being reflected in language? In many languages of the world, these ontological categories are expressed as grammatical distinctions.
For example, the ontological distinction is expressed as a grammatical distinction between things that physically exist. For instance, predicates, primarily verbs, serve as the universal representation of relations and events while nouns serve as the universal representation of names of physically existing things (Comrie, 1981; Croft, 1990). In many languages, even in the domain of nouns, the distinction between animal and inanimate objects and the distinction of individuality are marked in the grammar.
However, it is also true that there are many variations between different languages. As an illustration, some languages only index one of these two ontological categories, while others index both.
There are languages that index only one of these two ontological categories, and there are languages that index neither of them. If the way of indexing these ontological categories differs among languages, does it have any influence on our ontological cognition whether a language (especially a grammar) forcibly indexes a certain ontological category or not?
There is a rather complex and complicated debate on this issue, especially with regard to the distinction between individuality, in which three opposing views from the cognitive developmental, and cultural anthropological perspectives have been argued. Since this debate has very important implications for the evaluation of the Sapir-Wholf hypothesis, it is discussed in detail below.
Since this argument has very important implications for the evaluation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, we will discuss it in detail below.
Ontological awareness of individuality and grammatical categories in language
The question of individuality is a very important issue in Western philosophy, and this conceptual category is as important an ontological category as the categories of natural and artificial, biological and non-biological, because the classes of entities with individuality and the classes of entities without individuality are considered to be essentially different in their nature (Hirsh,1982)
The reason is that the classes of entities with individuality and the classes of entities without individuality are considered to be essentially different in nature (Hirsh, 1982; Quine, 1960, 1969; Ware, 1979; Wiggins, 1980). Let us take, for example, a “cup” belonging to the class of entities with individuality and “water” belonging to the class of entities without individuality.
Let us take the example of a “cup” belonging to the class of entities with individuality and “water” belonging to the class of entities without individuality. The criteria of whether or not the entire thing has the shape of a cup and performs the functions of a cup determines whether or not it belongs to the category of “cup.”
The criterion for determining whether an object belongs to the category of “cup” or not is whether the object as a whole has the shape of a cup and the function of a cup. Therefore, a “cup handle” is a “part of a cup” but not a cup, and each broken piece of a cup is a “piece of a cup” but not a “cup”. Each broken piece of a cup is a “piece of a cup”, not a “cup”. Also, there can be only one specific cup in space-time.
On the other hand, “water,” which is an entity without individuality, has no concept of “totality,” and the only criterion of identity is the identity of the substance. Unlike the case of a glass, there is no restriction that there can be only one “identical water” in one space-time, and as long as there is an identity of substance, “a drop of water in this bottle” and “all the water in this bottle” are the same as “a drop of water in that bottle” and “all the water in that bottle” are the same as “a drop of water in that bottle” and “a drop of water in that bottle” are the same as “a drop of water in that bottle. water in this bottle”, “all the water in this bottle”, “the water in that other bottle over there”, “the water in that other bottle over there”, “the water in that other bottle over there”.
The water in the other bottle over there” is “the same water” as long as there is identity.
Interestingly, the way this important ontological distinction is indexed in language is not uniform across different languages.
Comparison between Japanese and English
Let us compare English and Japanese, for example. For example, let’s compare English and Japanese. English grammatically indicates this ontological distinction of individuality very clearly and directly. In other words, English nouns are divided into two classes: countable and uncountable nouns. Individual entities are indicated by countable nouns, and as a terminal manifestation of this, nouns are directly marked by the plural morpheme (s) to the noun to indicate the plurality of the number.
This implies the assumption that the object itself is the counting unit. On the other hand, an indivisible entity indicated by an ‘uncountable noun’ does not have a unit of quantification in the object itself, so the unit of quantification has to be specified externally, as in “two glasses of water” or “a spoonful of salt”
In fact, particles in Japanese are not used in the same way as in English. In fact, particles in Japanese play the role of specifying the unit of quantity. Auxiliary numerals are words used to express numbers, such as “a cup” or “a spoonful” of water or “a spoonful” of salt. A “glass of water” or a “spoonful” of salt is exactly the same as the English “a glass of water”‘as poonful.
A glass of water” or “a spoonful ofsalt” is exactly equivalent to the English “a glass of water” or “‘as poonful ofsalt”. However, what is important about the particle system is that it applies not only to things such as water or salt, which have no form and cannot be quantified without an external unit, but also to things such as people, animals, cars, and computers, which have a definite counting unit, i.e., ontologically individualized entities in their own right. In other words, it can be applied to purely ontologically individualized entities.
In other words, from a purely linguistic point of view, an auxiliary language such as Japanese does not treat things existing in the world as having a prior (a priori) counting unit. In addition, the particle language treats all objects, including concrete and abstract objects, as if they belong to the class of uncountable nouns in English. In other words, the objects themselves are treated as if they had no individuality and no quantifiable unit, and the unit of quantification must be specified each time there is a need to quantify them (Quine, 1969; Lucy, 1992).
This is why the grammatical classification of concepts expressed by nouns in English and in the languages of the particles is not as clear as it is in the languages of the nouns.
This makes it clear that the grammatical classification of concepts represented by nouns is very different between English and the Participle languages. In English, all concepts are classified a priori according to whether they are individualized or not. In contrast, in the language of particles, such a distinction is not made at least at the grammar4 level.
In contrast, such a distinction is not made at least at the level of grammar 4. In language, the partitive languages do not distinguish between all things
In language, the partitive language treats all things as having no individuation unit of their own, puts everything into the category of uncountable nouns, and then treats ‘and also forms’ and ‘and also forms’ as ‘and also forms’.
The language of particles treats all things as having no discrete units of their own, and then treats all things as having no discrete units of their own, and then puts all things into uncountable noun categories.
The nouns are classified according to a complex mixture of criteria, including form, size, function, and biological classifications. (Downing, 1984; Imai, 2000; Uchida & Imai, 1996; Uchida & Imai, 1999).
